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INTRODUCTION

"They forget you are human."'
This was the response by South Carolina Department of Corrections
Death Row inmate John Doe when asked what it is like living on death row
2
for over 5,600 days. In a criminal justice system that allows the typical

2018 J.D. Candidate at the University of South Carolina School of Law. The author
is forever grateful to Susan Kuo for her endless guidance, support, and ink that filled the blank
spaces of each new draft of this Note. Equal gratitude is given to Boyd Young for inspiring the
author along this journey and allowing the author to tag along on countless trips to death row.

1.
2.

Interview with John Doe, Death Row Inmate, in Ridgeville, S.C. (Sep. 14, 2016).
Id.
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offender to sit on death row for an average of eighteen years3 in solitary
confinement, Doe's feelings are the rule rather than the exception.
Doe has never exhibited signs of mental illness, putting him in the
minority category of capital offenders. A recent study conducted by Justice
360 found that thirty-four of the forty-eight current death row inmates in
6
South Carolina qualified as severally mentally disabled. Inmates were
characterized as mentally disabled if they suffered from mental illness, brain
trauma/organic brain damage, or an intellectual disability that was
corroborated by an expert's diagnosis, brain scan evaluation, or professional
IQ test.7 Further research showed that mental illness, such as schizophrenia
and bi-polar disorder, was the most common mental disability prevalent
among these South Carolina Death Row inmates. 9
South Carolina's current administration of the death penalty against the
mentally ill defendant is unconstitutional in light of recent United States
Supreme Court cases. The Supreme Court has held that certain categories of
offenders shall not be subjected to the death penalty because of their
diminished culpability and their inability to truly understand the

3.
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
4.
For the purposes of this Note, mental illness refers to disorders of thought, mood or
behavior. They are unrelated to intelligence and many can be treated effectively. Examples
include depression, anxiety, schizophrenia and psychosis. Mental illness should be
distinguished from insanity. The definition of insanity is a legal rather than medical concept. In
South Carolina, the insanity of a defendant is determined by the M'Naghten Rule, that is-an
accused person may be absolved of criminal responsibility if they were incapable of
understanding their action or its wrongfulness. See State v. Wilson, 306 S.C. 498, 508, 413
S.E.2d 19, 25 (1992) (holding that South Carolina has chosen the M'Naghten test, or "right or
wrong" test as its insanity defense).
5. Justice 360 is a South Carolina non-profit organization which works to reform
policies and practices in capital proceedings through direct representation, serving appointed
capital case attorneys with legal resources, policy research, and public education. The Justice
360 (formerly Death Penalty Resource & Defense Center) study was conducted through
interviews with the attorneys for all forty-eight death row inmates on death row in 2014. The
interviews consisted of questions pertaining to the inmates' mental health history and any
effects that mental health may have had on the inmate's case. See EMILY PAAVOLA, MENTAL
DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY: WHY SOUTH CAROLINA SHOULD BAN
EXECUTION OF THE SEVERALLY MENTALLY DISABLED (2014) (on file with Justice 360).

6.
7.
8.

THE

Id. at 5.
Jd. at 5 n.10.

AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS § 2 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V]. Other disorders addressed in the

DSM-V include disorders diagnosed in childhood, cognitive disorders, substance-related
disorders, schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders, mood disorders, anxiety disorders,
somatoform disorders, factitious disorders, dissociative disorders, sleep and eating disorders,
impulse-control disorders, and sexual and gender identity disorders. Id.
9.
Id.
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consequences of their crimes.'o Like these offenders, the mentally ill
defendant has a diminished culpability because they too are unable to
adequately understand the nature of their crimes." Unlike these offenders,
however, South Carolina's death penalty statute allows for the execution of
the mentally ill offender.12
This Note argues that the execution of offenders who are mentally ill,
and that therefore have a diminished culpability, is contrary to the evolving
"standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"1 3 and
violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.1 4 While this Note advocates for a categorical ban on the
execution of mentally ill offenders, it recognizes that this call for action
cannot be immediate. Therefore, it additionally argues that South Carolina
should ban the use of death row for the mentally ill capital offenders in the
meantime because it can exacerbate symptoms or cause a recurrence of
psychotic episodes.
Part II of this Note provides a case illustration of a capital offender in
South Carolina suffering from mental illness. This illustration provides
background information into the defendant's offenses, family history,
medical diagnosis, and insight into capital trials in South Carolina. Further,
this illustration demonstrates how executing this offender suffering from
mental illness would have been incompatible with the evolving standards of
decency and would constitute as cruel and unusual punishment.
Part III of this Note discusses recent United States Supreme Court
opinions that held that mentally retarded offenders and juvenile offenders

10. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (banning the use of the death penalty
against juvenile offenders); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (stating that the court
had no reason to disagree that "death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded
criminal").
11. See generally Dora W. Klein, CategoricalExclusionsfrom CapitalPunishment, 72
BROOK. L. REV. 1211 (2007) (arguing that the Atkins and Roper decisions created a false sense
of justness because several other categories of offenders were not considered); See also
Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and UnresolvedPolicy
Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1210 (2005) (suggesting that "[a]n offender's mental illness
or addiction to drugs reduces his or her capacity to obey the law, thus making the offender less
blameworthy"); Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People with Mental
Illness, 33 N.M. L. REV. 293, 294 (2003) ("The ultimate conclusion is that distinguishing
between people with significant mental illness, people with mental retardation, and juveniles in
the application of capital punishment violates the Equal Protection Clause.").
12. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (2012) (making no reference to inapplicability to
mentally ill offenders).
13. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
15. Jeffrey L. Metzner & Jamie Fellner, Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in U.S.
Prisons:A Challengefor Medical Ethics, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 104, 104 (2010).
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should be banned from execution due to their diminished culpability.
Additionally, it examines the growing consensus against executing the
mentally ill among various organizations, courts, and scholars.
Part IV analyzes why the refusal to categorically exempt mentally ill
defendants from capital punishment violates the Constitution by comparing
the diminished culpability of mentally ill defendants to the diminished
culpability of offenders ineligible for the death penalty. It additionally
discusses how the penological purposes of punishment that are required for
the use of capital punishment are not met in executing the mentally ill.
Further, it addresses the prevalence of mental illness among South Carolina
capital offenders and how their mental illnesses relate to their diminished
culpability and create procedural obstacles during their trials.
Because exempting the mentally ill from execution cannot be
accomplished overnight, Part IV additionally discusses issues for the
mentally ill in South Carolina's criminal justice system stemming from
solitary confinement while on death row and a lack of professional mental
health services while incarcerated. It further argues that the South Carolina
legislature should rectify these systematic problems by prohibiting the use of
death row until the execution of the mentally ill is categorically banned in
South Carolina.
Part V discusses other state legislatures that have proposed or adopted
legislation banning the use of the death penalty on the mentally ill defendant
and the need for the South Carolina legislature to adopt a similar bill. It also
discusses a recent bill proposed in South Carolina that would bar the
mentally ill from the death penalty because of their diminished culpability.
II.

CASE ILLUSTRATION OF A SOUTH CAROLINA CAPITAL OFFENDER

The following case illustration is one of a South Carolina capital
offender Joshua Jones. In the years prior to the incident that led to his arrest
and subsequent conviction, Jones exhibited signs of mental illness. After
his arrest and while incarcerated, Jones displayed signs of serious mental
disturbance.' 7 Unlike other capital defendants in South Carolina," the

16. See Teddy Kulmala, Jones Guilty of Murder, AIKEN STANDARD (Feb. 3, 2014),
http://www.aikenstandard.com/news/jones-guilty-of-murder/article_56a2eea9-225a-537e9ddc-8a88873b5b85.html#comments (discussing the diminished mental capacity of Joshua
Jones).
17. Id.
18. For example, Dylann Roof, who was convicted of killing nine people in a church in
2015, offered to plead guilty in exchange for a life sentence. The federal government declined
his offer and proceeded with a capital trial. Alan Blinder & Kevin Sack, Dylann Roof Found
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prosecution in Jones' case ultimately accepted Jones' plea offer as "guilty
but mentally ill" in exchange for a life sentence instead of the death
penalty.' 9 By accepting a "guilty but mentally ill plea," the prosecution and
the circuit court inexplicitly acknowledged that Jones had a diminished
culpability and subjecting him to the death penalty would be wrong.20 As
noted earlier, there is an overwhelming number of capital offenders on South
Carolina's death row that suffer from a mental illness similar to Jones.2
However, unlike Jones, any pleas offers for life were rejected, their attorneys
did not raise the issue, or the jury misperceived their mental illness, and all
22
of these mentally ill offenders were given a death sentence.
While this case illustration portrays a capital offender who was able to
negotiate a life sentence, it better serves to provide insight into the
debilitating mental health issues that South Carolina mentally ill capital
offenders experienced prior to their conviction and how they too had a
diminished culpability that should have disallowed the use of the death
penalty. 23 Had there been a statutory ban on executing the mentally ill, they
too would have received a life sentence instead of a death sentence.
Joshua Jones was charged with the murder of Sandy Rogers, a Public
24
Safety Officer in Aiken, South Carolina in January 2012. Rogers and two
other officers were responding to a call of two suspicious vehicles parked in
25
a local park on the morning of January 28, 2012. When Rogers approached
a blue BMW at the park, the driver of the BMW, who was later identified as
26
Jones, fired three shots at Rogers and fled the scene. Rogers was taken to

Guilty
in Charleston Church Massacre, N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
15,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/15/us/dylann-roof-trial.html.
19. See
Death
Row
List,
S.C.
DEP'T
OF
CORRECTIONS
(2013),
http://www.doc.sc.gov/pubweb/news/death-row-report.pdf
(listing all current inmates
sentenced to death. All listed inmates could have had a plea offer yet still later sentenced to
death or they may not have offered a plea); Meg Kinnard, Ivey to Die Today: Man Who Killed
Officer, Businessman to be Executed at 6 p.m., THE T&D (May 8, 2009),
http://thetandd.com/news/ivey-to-die-today-man-who-killed-officer-businessman-to/article
c238fe64-81ab-5fb2-9199-629d6e9912cc.html (including a list of regional death row inmates
and a brief synopsis of their cases).
20. According to the current "guilty but mentally ill" statute, "[a] defendant is guilty but
mentally ill if, at the time of the commission of the act constituting the offense, he had the
capacity to distinguish right from wrong or to recognize his act as being wrong as defined in
Section 17-24-10(A), but because of mental disease or defect he lacked sufficient capacity to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20(A) (2012).
21. See supra PartI.
22. See Death Row List, supranote 19.
23. See Kulmala, supra note 16.
24. Kulmala, supra note 16.
25. Id
26. Id
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27

Aiken Regional Medical Centers and pronounced dead later that afternoon.
The murder of a local law enforcement officer is a statutory aggravating
circumstance in South Carolina, and therefore, makes the defendant eligible
for the death penalty.28 The prosecution's theory was that Jones misbelieved
he was being arrested for another crime when he was approached by Rogers
and shot her to escape.29
Initially, Jones was given a psychiatric evaluation.30 At the
recommendation of a forensic psychiatrist and due to the behavior he
exhibited after his arrest, Jones additionally underwent a clinical interview
and neuropsychological evaluation while awaiting trial in 2013.31 After
reviewing the evaluation results, the forensic psychiatrist, Donna Swartz,
32
diagnosed and later testified that Jones suffers from schizophrenia.
Swartz' report and testimony noted several significant findings in Jones'
past.33 Jones has a maternal history of schizophrenia. 34 His great
grandmother was committed to the South Carolina State Hospital where she
was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and experienced persecutory
delusions.35 Jones reported being sexually molested as a child by his uncle.36
In June 2011, Jones attempted suicide by shooting himself in the head.37
This resulted in severe brain damage which affected the areas of the brain
38
controlling emotion, impulse control, and judgment in stressful situations.
Jones had inpatient treatment after his attempted suicide and was diagnosed
with Major Depressive Disorder with suicidal ideation and Post Traumatic
39
Stress Disorder.
While in inpatient treatment, he was described as
40
disoriented, distractible, anxious, and as having a diminished memory.
After his arrest, Jones was observed biting his wrists to the point that
they were bleeding, and standing in his cell so long that his feet were

27. Id.
28. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(a)(7) (2012).
29. Kulmala, supranote 16.
30. DONNA SCHWARTZ-WATTS, PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION 2 (Feb. 21, 2013) (Jones'
psychiatric evaluation report by Dr. Swartz) (on file with author).
31. ToRA
BRAWLEY,
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL
EVALUATION
(2013)
(Jones'
neuropsychological evaluation report by Dr. Brawley) (on file with author).
32. Kulmala, supranote 16.
33. Id.
34. SCHWARTZ-WATTS, supra note 30, at 2-4.
35. Id. at 2.
36. Kulmala, supranote 16.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. SCHWARTZ-WATTS, supra note 30, at 3.
40. Id.
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edematous. 4' He told a designated examiner at the Aiken County Detention
Center that he continually heard voices saying "we want to play with you"
42
that encouraged him to commit violent acts. He also saw blurry ghosts in
his periphery, and believed that we are living out the events from the book of
Revelations. 43 He would often stand in his cell, moving little, whispering or
growling "ahhh" repeatedly and holding his jaw stiffly while showing all of
his teeth.44 In a video from his bond hearing days after the murder, Jones is
seen convulsing, growling, and even cursing at the judge.45
This compilation of symptoms made it clear that Jones was suffering
from some sort of severe mental illness at the time of the offense and was
continuing to suffer. In 2014, Jones pled "guilty but mentally ill" in
exchange for a life sentence without the possibility of parole to avoid the
death penalty.46 The prosecutor in the case, Strom Thurmond, Jr., stated to a
local news source that there are cases and times where prosecutors are
"ethically prohibited from leveraging the death penalty." 47 This was one of
them.48
There is a myriad of possible reasons for why Jones was able to
negotiate a life sentence as opposed to the death penalty. For example, the
judge and prosecutors in Aiken County may have been more understanding
of mental health issues and mental illness' diminution on culpability.
Therefore, they decided it was best to allow a life sentence. It is also
possible that because Jones displayed such obvious symptoms of mental
illness throughout his incarceration, such as at his bond hearing, that there
was more pressure to accept the life plea. However, there is no precise
answer.
As noted earlier, many offenders on death row suffer from mental
illness, but did not receive the same sentence as Jones.49 In fact, several of
them suffer from the exact same illness as Jones.o Why these mentally ill

41. Id; see generally EDEMA OVERVIEW, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/heartdisease/heart-failure/edema-overview#1 (last visited Dec. 30, 2016) (explaining that edema is
the medical term for swelling, and the causes of edema).
42.

SCHWARTZ-WATTS, supranote 30, at 4.

43. Id
44. Id
45. Chad Mills, As Cop Killer Pleads Guilty, New Video Released Showing Mental
Illness, WRDW12 (Feb. 3, 2014, 7:15 PM), http://www.wrdw.com/home/headlines/JoshuaJones-pleads-guilty-to-murdering-Officer-Sandy-Rogers-243322151 .html?device=phone.
46. Kulmala, supra note 16.
47. Mills, supra note 45.
48. Id
49. PAAVOLA, supra note 5.
50. Id
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men on death row received a death sentence as opposed to a life sentence
like Jones is unclear. Perhaps they had prosecutors and judges who were less
sympathetic to the effects of mental illness on one's ability to conform and
abide by the law or understand the consequence of one's actions. Perhaps
their symptoms were less obvious or extreme as Jones. However, one thing
is clear. If there was a legislative ban in South Carolina on executing the
mentally ill due to their diminished culpability, a substantial number of
South Carolina's capital offenders who suffer from a mental illness would be
serving a life sentence. Instead, they sit on death row awaiting an execution
that is arguably a violation against the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel
and unusual punishment.
III. A GROWING CONSENSUS AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY
A.

The Use of the Death Penalty on Those with Diminished Culpability
is ConsideredCruel and Unusual Punishment

The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution states:
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." 52 The United States Supreme Court has
found that "[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing
less than the dignity of man .... The Amendment must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." 53 These "evolving standards of decency" are determined by an
array of sources including, state legislative enactments, the practice of
sentencing juries, the opinions of social, religious, and professional
54
organizations, international practices, and polling data.
The U.S. Supreme Court has described the contours of the Eighth
Amendment as applied to mentally retardedoffenders. In 2002, the United

51. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., STATE BY STATE DATABASE: SOUTH CAROLINA,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state bystate (last visited Dec. 19, 2016); see also VICTOR
STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FOR FEMALE OFFENDERS, JANUARY 1, 1973, THROUGH DECEMBER
31, 2012, 5, 7, 12 (2013), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FemDeathDec2012.pdf
(discussing the execution history of women in South Carolina). All current death row
offenders on South Carolina's death row are men. There are no women. In fact, South Carolina
has executed just three women in the history of South Carolina's death penalty use.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
53. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 100-01 (1958)).
54. See id. at 313-21.
55. Id. at 306-07. The Court cites to the American Psychiatric Association for a
definition of mental retardation to be used throughout the case. Mental retardation is defined as
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States Supreme Court ruled in Atkins v. Virginia that the Eighth Amendment
forbids the death penalty for persons who suffer from mental retardation
because it violated their constitutional right against cruel and unusual
56
punishment.
The Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty was excessive for this
group of offenders in viewing the Eighth Amendment in the light of
"standards of evolving decency" and was not persuaded that executing the
mentally retarded offender would "measurably advance the deterrent or
retributive purpose of the death penalty." 5 7 The underlying penological
purpose behind retribution (that is, a wrongdoer gets his "just deserts") is
that the gravity of the punishment depends on the culpability of the
wrongdoer. In Atkins, the Court held that the mentally retarded are less
culpable for their crimes or offenses because they are less able to
"understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from
mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others." 59 Relying on the
earlier language of the Supreme Court establishing that the death penalty is
to be administered on only the "most extreme of crimes" 60 the Court
determined that "the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender
61
surely does not merit" the use of the death penalty on them.
The Supreme Court was also not persuaded that the execution of the
62
mentally retarded would serve as a deterrent. The mentally retarded are
less likely to be deterred by the threat of the death penalty because of their
cognitive deficiencies, and sparing them from this severe punishment "will

significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by
significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas:
communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community
resources, self-direction, functional academical skills, work, leisure, health, and safety
(Criterion B). The onset must occur before age 18 years (Criterion C). See DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th ed. 2000). Additionally, South
Carolina also uses the term "mentally retarded" in several capital cases. See State v. Laney,
367 S.C. 639, 627 S.E.2d 726 (2006); Franklin v. Maynard, 356 S.C. 276, 588 S.E.2d 604
(2003); State v. Jones, 298 S.C. 118, 378 S.E.2d 594 (1989).
56. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306-07.
57. Id at 321.
58. Id at 319.
59. Id at 318.
60. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
61. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
62. See id. at 320 ("Thus, executing the mentally retarded will not measurably further
the goal of deterrence.").
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not affect the cold calculus that precedes the decision of other potential
murderers." 63
Additionally, the Atkins Court stated that eliminating this subset of
offenders is legitimate because there is a higher risk of wrongful execution
64
of the mentally retarded offender. This risk stems from the chance that the
mentally retarded offender will make a "false confession" by mistake or
because of their lesser ability to "give meaningful assistance to their
counsel" because they are "typically poor witnesses, and their demeanor
may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes."
Therefore, not only does the mentally retarded offender have diminished
66
culpability, they may also be unable to effectively aid in their defense.
Further, the mentally retarded offender, much like the mentally ill
67
offender, may receive a wrongful conviction because of an increased
likelihood the jury will find the defendant has an "aggravating factor of
future dangerousness."
The Court further described the contours of the Eighth Amendment as
applied to the juvenile capital offender in Roper v. Simmons. 69 The Supreme
Court, citing Atkins, reiterated that the death penalty is unconstitutional
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause if it does not serve as
retribution or act as a deterrence. 70 Courts have found that "[u]nless the
death penalty . .. measurably contributes to one or both of these goals, it 'is
nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and
suffering,' and hence an unconstitutional punishment." 7
The Court in Roper found that juveniles are not as culpable as adults for
their crimes because they "lack [] maturity and [have] an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility . .. are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative
influences and outside pressures . .. [and have a] character [that] is not as

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
428 U.S.
71.
584, 592
U.S. 660

Id. at 319 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186).
Id. at 321.
Id.
See id.
See infra Part III.B.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (2002) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 323 (1989)).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005).
Roper, 543 U.S. at 571 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
153, 183 (1976) (oint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.))).
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
(1977)). See also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153-83 (1976); Robinson v. California, 370
(1962); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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72

well formed as that of an adult. Due to this diminished culpability,
retribution is not an adequate and proportionate punishment for juveniles.73
Juveniles are also not deterred by the death penalty because of their
diminished culpability. The Court reasoned that "the same characteristics
that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles
will be less susceptible to deterrence" 74 and the chances that a juvenile has
made a "cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of
execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent."7 5
B.

There is a Growing Consensus That the Death Penalty Should Not
be Usedfor Punishingthe Mentally Ill

Today, there is substantial support for the idea that the evolving
standards of decency not only prohibit the execution of mentally retarded
and juvenile offenders, but also of the mentally ill. There are findings which
show that Americans are against the use of the death penalty entirely.
76
Support for the death penalty is at its lowest in more than four decades. As
of late 2016, less than half of Americans now favor the death penalty.7 7

Further, juries around the country indicated their reluctance to inflict the
death penalty by imposing only thirty death sentences in 2016, a 40% drop
from last year and fewer than at any time since the Supreme Court reinstated
capital punishment in 1976.
Additionally, recent polling of United States citizens makes clear that
Americans reject death as a punishment option for the mentally ill
specifically. According to a 2014 poll by Public Policy Polling, Americans
oppose the death penalty for persons with mental illness by a margin of twoto-one. 79 The poll surveyed 943 Americans across the country and found that
opposition to the death penalty for persons with mental illness was strong

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
Id. at 571.
Id
Id at 572 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988)).
Baxter Oliphant, Support for Death Penalty Lowest in More than Four Decades,
PEW
RESEARCH
CTR.
(Sept.
29,
2016),
http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/09/29/support-for-death-penalty-lowest-in-more-than-four-decades/.
77. Id.
78. Editorial, The Continuing Collapse of the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/26/opinion/the-continuing-collapse-of-the-deathpenalty.html?emc=etal&_r=0 (citing The Death Penalty in 2016: Year End Report, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR. (2016), http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2016YrEnd.pdf).
79. Press Release, New Nationwide Poll Shows Americans Oppose Death Penalty in
Cases Where Person has Mental Illness by 2-1 Margin (Dec. 1, 2014) (on file with author).
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across genders, income brackets, and education levels. 0 Such data provides
strong support for the South Carolina legislature to ban the use of the death
penalty on the mentally ill as a matter of public opinion.
These oppositional views towards the death penalty used against the
mentally ill are also shared by South Carolinians.' A survey by the
University of South Carolina College of Arts and Sciences Institute for
Public Service and Policy Research in 2009 found that "74.0% of adults of
in South Carolina were opposed to the death penalty where a severely
mentally ill person is convicted of murder, while only 16.3% were in
favor."82 However, the opposition towards the death penalty doesn't stop
here.
Some professional organizations are outwardly against the execution of
mentally ill defendants. 83 For example, the American Bar Association
("ABA") advocates for a categorical exemption of the severely mentally ill
from capital punishment:
Defendants should not be executed or sentenced to death if, at the
time of the offense, they had a severe mental disorder or disability
that significantly impaired their capacity (a) to appreciate the
nature, consequences, or wrongfulness of their conduct; (b) to
exercise rational judgment in relation to conduct; or (c) to conform
their conduct to the requirements of the law ....
The ABA's stance has been adopted by the National Alliance on Mental
Illness ("NAMI"), Mental Health America ("MHA"), 6 the American

80. Id.
81. See PAAVOLA, supranote 5, at 20.
82. Id. (citing University of South Carolina College of Arts and Sciences Institute for
Public Service and Policy Research, "South Carolina State Survey" (Spring 2009)).
83. ABA, MENTAL ILLNESS RESOLUTION 1 (2006), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/uncategorized/Death PenaltyRepresentation/2006_am_122a.authcheckdam.
pdc.
84. Id.
85. NAMI is a large grassroots mental health organization that works to raise awareness
of mental health issues. See PUBLIC POLICY COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS & THE
NAMI DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC POLICY & RESEARCH, PUBLIC POLICY PLATFORM OF THE
NATIONAL

ALLIANCE

ON

MENTAL

ILLNESS

§

10.9,

at

73

(10th

ed.

2014),

https://www.nami.org/NAMI/media/NAMI-Media/downloads/Public-Policy-Platform
9-2214.pdf; LAURIE FLYNN, No DEATH PENALTY FOR PERSONS WITH SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESSES
(Nat. All. Mental Illness, 1998).
86. MHA is a national community-based nonprofit dedicated to addressing the needs of
those living with mental illness mainly through the promotion of mental health as a critical
part of overall wellness, prevention services, early identification and intervention for at-risk
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Psychiatric Association,1 7 and the American Psychological Association.
NAMI's stance is "the death penalty is never appropriate for a defendant
suffering from schizophrenia or other serious brain disorders." 89 NAMI's
rationale is that the legal criteria used for evaluating crimes of people with
mental illness was created over 200 years ago and with today's modem
science, ability to accurately diagnosis, and medical treatment, a mental
illness should serve as reason not to execute a criminal defendant. 90
MHA takes an analogous viewpoint and urges for a moratorium on the
use of the death penalty against mentally ill offenders. 91 MHA's reasoning is
that a mentally ill offender is at such a substantial disadvantage in defending
themselves against criminal charges, just like Atkins' discussion on the
mentally retarded offender unwittingly confessing to crimes and their
92
inability to provide meaningful assistance to counsel. Further, mentally ill
offenders can be "threatened and coerced into false confessions, have
difficulty understanding their rights, and have less access, because of their
mental illness, to safeguards designed to protect fundamental rights,
including the right to effective assistance of legal counsel." 93
Organizations outside of the United States also tend to agree that the
execution of this vulnerable demographic is unacceptable by today's
standards of decency and urge the United States to adopt legislation to
prohibit the practice of executing the mentally ill defendant. 94 For example,
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights has adopted resolutions
urging all states that administer the death penalty "not to impose the death
penalty on a person suffering from any form of mental disorder or to execute
any such person." 95 Additionally, The United Nations Special Rapporteur on

individuals, and integrated care and treatment for those in need. See MENTAL HEALTH AM.,
POSITION STATEMENT 54: DEATH PENALTY AND PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS (approved
Jun. 14, 2016).
87. The American Psychiatric Association is an organization of psychiatrists working to
ensure humane care and treatment for people suffering from mental illness. See AM.
PSYCHIATRIC Ass., POSITION STATEMENT: DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY IN CAPITAL
SENTENCING (approved Dec. 2004).
88. E. Packard, Associations Concur on Mental Disabilityand DeathPenalty Policy, 38
MONITOR ON PSYCHOLOGY 14, 14 (2007).
89. See FLYNN, supra note 85 (emphasis added).
90. Id.
91. MENTAL HEALTH AM., supranote 86, at 54.
92. Id.
93. Id
94.
95.

See AMNESTY INT'L, infra note 95; AMNESTY INT'L, infra note 97.
AMNESTY INT'L, DEATH PENALTY AND MENTAL ILLNESS, http://www.amnesty

usa.org/our-work/issues/death-penalty/us-death-penalty-facts/death-penalty-and-mental-illness
(last visited Jan. 1, 2017).
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Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions asked that governments
that continue to administer the death penalty against the mentally ill "bring
their domestic legislation into conformity with international legal
standards." 96 Also, Amnesty International issued a comprehensive report on
the execution of mentally ill offenders in the United States that urged state
legislatures to adopt legislation prohibiting the execution of the mentally ill
in part because implementing "premeditated ritualistic killing" against
mentally ill offenders is offensive to the evolving standards of decency. 97
When it comes to who should be subjected to the death penalty, legal
academics similarly contend that mentally ill offenders have a diminished
culpability like mentally retarded offenders and juvenile offenders. 98 For the
mentally ill defendant, "delusions, command hallucinations, and disoriented
thought process[es] .

.

. represent greater dysfunction than that experienced

'

by most 'mildly' retarded individuals ... and by virtually any non-mentally
ill teenager." 99 Therefore, executing the mentally ill would violate the Eighth
Amendment because like categories of offenders with diminished culpability
have already been barred from eligibility of execution.' 00
The call for legislative reform is not only coming from legal scholars,
mental health organizations, and the ABA, but from state courts as well.' 0
In 2011, Ohio State Supreme Court Chief Justice Maureen O'Connor
commissioned a joint task force to evaluate the administration of the death

96. Id.
97. AMNESTY INT'L, USA: THE EXECUTION OF MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS (2006),
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/72000/amr510032006en.pdf (last visited Jan.
1, 2017).
98. Slobogin, supra note 11, at Pt. III. See also Lyn Entzeroth, The Challenge and
Dilemma of Chartinga Course to Constitutionally Protect the Severely Mentally Ill Capital
Defendantfrom the Death Penalty, 44 AKRON L. REV. 529, 557-58 (2011) (arguing that those
with severe mental illness may possess the same diminished culpability as teenagers and
mentally retarded offenders whom the Supreme Court has held are protected from the death
penalty by the Eighth Amendment); Helen Shin, Is the Death of the Death Penalty Near the
Impact of Atkins and Roper on the Future of Capital Punishmentfor Mentally Ill Defendants,
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 465, 515-16 (2007) (arguing that the arguments the Supreme Court
made about the diminished culpability of juveniles and mentally retarded persons can also be
applied to the severely mentally ill).
99. Christopher Slobogin, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 1 CAL. CRIM. L. REV.
3, ¶ 12 (2000).
100. Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court's Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence:
Severe Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B. C. L. REV. 785, 856 (2009).
101. See Chris Davey, Death Penalty Task Force Releases Final Report, COURT NEWS
OHIO
(May
21,
2014),
http://www.courtnewsohio.gov/happening/2014/
deathPenaltyTFReport 052114.asp#.WKpyYxiVSt8 (highlighting the results of a study of the
death penalty commissioned by the Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court).
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penalty in Ohio.102 The task force's final suggestions, released in 2014,
included a recommendation to enact legislation to exclude those with
"serious mental illness" from the death penalty.103 In a recent capital case,
Justice Pfeifer of the Ohio Supreme Court wrote "[m]ental illness is a
medical disease . . . [and] executing a convict with a severe mental illness is

cruel and unusual punishment."1 04
Additionally, judges are recognizing that there is a parallel diminution
of culpability between the mentally retarded and the mentally ill. o0

For

example, Indiana Supreme Court Justice Rucker wrote that "the underlying
rationale for prohibiting executions of the mentally retarded is just as
compelling for prohibiting executions of the seriously mentally ill, namely
evolving standards of decency." 0 6
IV. No

DEATH
OFFENDERS ...

A.

PENALTY
FOR
THE
DIMINISHED
CULPABILITY
SHOULD THIS INCLUDE THE MENTALLY ILL?

Mental Illness in South Carolina'sPrison System and its Prisoners
DiminishedCulpability

A significant portion of the U.S. population (an estimated 18%) is
affected by mental illness. 107 The most debilitating among these mental
illnesses include: major depression, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder,
obsessive compulsive disorder, panic disorder, post-traumatic stress
disorder, and borderline personality disorder.0 8 Rather than receiving the
treatment and help they need, many suffering from mental illness end up

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. State v. Scott, 748 N.E.2d 11, 20 (Ohio 2001) (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
105. See Overstreet v. State, 877 N.E.2d 144, 175 (2007) (finding no principled
distinction between the diminished capacities exhibited of the mentally ill defendant and the
diminished capacities that exempt the mentally retarded from execution); Bryan v. Mullin, 335
F.3d 1207, 1237 (2003) (finding that the logic used in Atkins should apply to those who suffer
severe mental disabilities). Contra State v. Weik, 587 S.E.2d 683, 687 (2002) (finding that
"while it violates the Eighth Amendment to impose a death sentence on a mentally retarded
defendant, the imposition of such a sentence upon a mentally ill person is not
disproportionate").
106. Corcoran v. State, 774 N.E.2d 495, 502 (2002) (Rucker, J., dissenting).
107. Mental

Health

by

the

Numbers,

NAT'L

ALL.

ON

MENTAL

ILLNESS,

http://www.nami.org/Learn-More/Mental-Health-By-the-Numbers (last visited Jan. 2, 2017).
108. DSM-V, supra note 8.
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incarcerated.' 09 In fact, a person suffering from a mental illness in the United
States is three times more likely to be incarcerated than hospitalized. 10
There is also evidence that mental illness is highly prevalent in the
capital offender population of South Carolina."' As noted in the
introduction, Justice 360 of Columbia, SC discovered that there is an
extensive number of capital offenders within the South Carolina Department
of Corrections suffering from a serious mental disability, which includes
traumatic brain injury, mental illness, or intellectual disability.11 2 Of the
forty-eight capital offenders on death row at the time of the study, thirty-four
qualified as severely mentally disabled, or slightly more than 70%.113 Mental
illness, defined as including schizophrenia, post-traumatic stress disorder,
major depressive disorder, and bipolar disorder, was the most prevalent
mental disability. 114 Twelve inmates suffered from multiple types of these
three conditions such as mental illness and traumatic brain injury or mental
5
illness and an intellectual disability."
Many of these illnesses, such as schizophrenia, interfere with a person's
ability to think coherently, manage emotions, make decisions, and relate to
others.
Symptoms of schizophrenia'
include hallucinations (hearing
voices, seeing objects and people, or smelling things that others cannot
perceive), delusions ("a fixed, relatively immutable, persistent, false belief

109. This over-incarceration is argued to have been the result of the deinstitutionalization
movement of the 1960s. Many state mental institutes were shut down and those individuals
released from these institutions found themselves homeless, arrested for petty crimes or
homelessness, or using drugs to self-medicate. See Michael Vitiello, Addressing the Special
Problems of the Mentally Ill Prisoners:A Small Piece of the Solution to Our Nation'sPrison
Crisis, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 57, 60-63 (2010) (citing H. Richard Lamb & Leona L. Bachrach,
Some Perspectives on Deinstitutionalization, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 1039, 1044 (2001),
http://psychservices.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/reprint/52/8/1039).
110. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Jeff George, The Ninth Circle of Hell: An Eighth
Amendment Analysis of Imposing ProlongedSupermax Solitary Confinement on Inmates with
a Mental Illness, 90 DENV. L. REV. 1 (2012).
111. PAAVOLA, supra note 5, at 5.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 6.
115. Id.
116. Schizophrenia, NAT'L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, http://www.nami.org/LeamMore/Mental-Health-Conditions/Schizophrenia
(last visited Jan. 2, 2017) (hereinafter
Schizophrenia). See generally CHARLOTTE SCHOOL OF LAW, MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE
DEATH PENALTY IN NORTH CAROLINA: A DIAGNOSTIC APPROACH 11 (2007),
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/files/pdf/CharlotteMl.pdf (discussing how research finding a
correlation between mental illness and violence depends on a combination of factors).
117. Schizophrenia, supranote 116.
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that has no basis in reality"),"s negative symptoms (such as flat affect), and
cognitive disturbances/disorganized thinking." 9
These symptoms experienced by the mentally ill may diminish their
culpability like other categorically exempted offenders.120 Atkins decided
that the mentally retarded offender was ineligible for the death penalty
because of their "diminished capacities to understand and process
information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to
understand the reactions of others."12' Roper reached the same decision with
respect to juveniles because "[t]he likelihood that the teenage offender has
made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the
possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent."1 22 The
brief description above of the possible symptoms experienced by the
mentally ill makes clear that people who suffer from mental illness also have
great difficulty in communicating with and understanding others, engaging
in logical cost-benefit analysis, and evaluating the consequences of and
controlling their behavior.123
Further, considering the potential symptoms defendants with mental
illnesses may experience, it is likely these defendants are unable to
effectively assist their attorneys or participate significantly in their defense
due to their inability to think coherently and relate to others.124 This in turn
may lead to an increased chance of wrongful convictions of the mentally ill
offender like the increased chance of wrongful conviction of the mentally
retarded offender as discussed in Atkins.125 For example, a defendant with
severe mental illness such as schizophrenia may be incapable of or reluctant
to cooperate with their lawyers in the investigation and preparation of their
case due to a negative symptom such as poor executive functioning skills.1 26

118. Adrian Furnham, The Psychology of Delusions, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (June 23,
2015),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/sideways-view/201506/the-psychology-delu
S1oIS.

119. Schizophrenia,supra note 116.
120. See generally Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that mentally
retarded offenders are not eligible for the death penalty because of their diminished capacity);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (holding that juveniles are not eligible for the
death penalty because of their diminished capacity).
121. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
122. Roper, 543 U.S. at 561.
123. Slobogin, supranote 11, at 304.
124. See CHARLOTTE SCHOOL OF LAW, supra note 116, at 21.
125. See supra Part III.A.
126. See generally Schizophrenia, NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH (Feb. 2016),
Schizophrenia, https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/schizophrenia/index.shtml#part 145
430 (last visited Jan. 3, 2017) (some patients with schizophrenia experience cognitive
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The same mentally ill defendant may demand to represent himself or may
waive essential rights as a result of delusions about their attorneys or the
belief that they are a part of a conspiracy scheme against them. 127If a
defendant is on medications at the time of the trial, there is a chance that he
may appear drowsy, uninterested in the trial, or lacking remorse to the jury
when it is actually the side effects of his medications causing such
behavior. 12 On the other hand, if a mental illness is left untreated, a
defendant may appear to be pugnacious, agitated, or out of control to a
*129
jury.
B. Punishment Goals Are Not Served by Executing the Mentally Ill
Defendant
Like the Court's discussion in Atkins and Roper,1 30 using the death
penalty against the mentally ill does not advance the requisite deterrent or
retributive punishment purposes necessary to inflict the death penalty.
People do not decide to develop mental illness. The existence of the death
penalty cannot deter people from experiencing schizophrenic episodes or
from acting in a manner that stems from their illness.131 Further, it is hard to
deter a mentally ill offender who gives little to no thought to the possible
consequences of their actions because they are experiencing hallucinations,
delusions, or distorted thinking.132
The retributive purpose of the death penalty is also not served when an
offender is unable to meaningfully understand that the state is taking his life

symptoms such as poor executive function, or the ability to understand information and use it
to make decisions).
127. KRISTIN HOULE, MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE DEATH PENALTY RESOURCE GUIDE
(2d ed.
2008),
tcadp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/06/MIDPResourceGuideSecond
edition.pdf.
128. See generally Mental Health Medications, NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH (Oct.
2016), https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/mental-health-medications/index.shtml#part
149866 (last visited Jan. 3, 2017) (describing the side effects of medications such as
antidepressants and anti-anxiety medications, which can make someone agitated, restless,
aggressive or violent, etc., and which can lead to drowsiness, unsteadiness, problems with
coordination, difficulty remembering, etc.).
129. Id.
130. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318; Roper, 543 U.S. at 561.
131. HOULE, supra note 127, at 4.
132. See The Death Penalty: Questions and Answers, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Sept.
2011),
https://www.aclu.org/other/death-penalty-questions-and-answers?redirect=deathpenalty-questions-and-answers ("The death penalty has no deterrent effect.... People commit
murders . . . because they are mentally ill, giving little or no thought to the possible
consequences of their acts.").

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol68/iss4/4

18

Klein: Flying over the Cuckoo's Nest: How the Mentally Ill Landed into a
2017]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

589

to hold him accountable for his crime.' 33 Holding someone accountable is
meant to be an affirmation of personal responsibility and giving the offender
his "just deserts." 3 4 Executing someone who lacks a meaningful
understanding of the nature of his punishment and its retributive purpose
offends the notion of personal responsibility rather than affirming it.13 5
C.

The CurrentState ofDeath Row in South Carolina

While this Note advocates for the categorical ban on the execution of
mentally ill offenders because of their diminished culpability, it also
recognizes that passing legislation takes time. While the legislature works on
statutorily banning the use of the death penalty against the mentally ill,136 it

should also ban the use of death row for the mentally ill capital offender.
Death row today involves an excessive delay between sentencing and
execution, solitary confinement, and a lack of professional help for mental
health.137 While cruel in its own regard to the non-mentally ill prisoner, the
aftermath of being sentenced to death has especially cruel effects on the
mentally ill.' 38 For example, the stress, unstructured days, and lack of
meaningful interaction with other people can exacerbate symptoms or induce
recurrence of episodes by the mentally ill offender.139
The length of stay on death row also negatively impacts the symptoms
of the mentally ill.140 The average time on death row has increased over the
last few decades. In 1960, the average time from sentencing to punishment
was two years.141 However, inmates today spend close to sixteen years on
death row.142 In South Carolina, the average wait time on death row was

133. See ABA, supra note 83, at 1 (explaining death sentence should not carried out
against a prisoner who lacks the ability to understand the "nature and purpose of the
punishment, or to appreciate the reason for its imposition in the prisoner's own case").
134. Id. at 12.
135. See id. at 16 (explaining that offenders should have "more than a shallow
understanding of why they are being executed" for the retributive aim of punishment to be
fulfilled).
136. H. 3535, 121st Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2016).
137. Metzner & Fellner, supra note 15, at 104.
138. See id. at 105 (explaining the results of class action cases challenging segregating
the mentally ill as "unconstitutionally cruel because of the psychological harm").
139. Id. (citing Sasha Abramsky & Jamie Fellner, Ill-Equipped: U.S. Prisons and
Offenders
with
Mental
Illness,
HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH
14
(2003),
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usalO03/usalOO3.pdf).
140. Metzner & Fellner, supra note 15, at 104.
141. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764 (2015).
142. TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2012STATISTICAL TABLES (May 2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpl2st.pdf.
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over 14 years.1 43 While these excessive delays are arguably necessary to
ensure proper appeals,144 the mentally ill offender is forced to spend over a
decade subjected to an environment that can cause the reoccurrence of
episodes or exacerbation of symptoms.1 45

In most states, including South Carolina, death row inmates are
segregated and housed in buildings separated from the general prison
population, but suffer from much more than simply being confined in a
separate building.146 In fact, confinement on death row has been described as
a "living death .

.

. a place where the body is preserved while the person

languishes and ultimately dies awaiting execution."147 Most death row
prisoners are housed in conditions designed for inmates who are disciplinary
problems, and not intended to be used for long term incarceration.1 48
Like most states, South Carolina enforces restrictions on death row
inmates that isolate them from human interaction. 149 These restrictions vary
from facility to facility,15 0 but can include: confinement to a single-person
cell with a steel bed, steel toilet, and small writing table, in an area ranging
from thirty-six feet to one hundred feet for up to twenty-three hours a day;151
isolation during meal times (eaten in this same cell);152 isolation during

143. The Faces of South Carolina's Death Row, POST & COURIER (Oct. 16, 2015),
http://www.postandcourier.com/news/the-faces-of-south-carolina-s-deathrow/article de65784b-c532-5390-bfc2-ceb44fa33dad.html
144. See, e.g., Death Penalty Appeals Process, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN CONTEXT,
http://www.capitalpunishmentincontext.org/resources/dpappealsprocess
(last visited Jan. 3,
2017) (explaining the death penalty appeals process).
145. Metzner & Fellner, supra note 15, at 105 (citing Abramsky & Fellner, supra note
139, at 14).
146. Robert Johnson, Solitary Confinement Until Death by State Sponsored Homicide:
An EighthAmendment Assessment of the Modern Execution Process, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1213, 1216 (2016) (citing ROBERT JOHNSON, CONDEMNED TO DIE: LIFE UNDER SENTENCE OF
DEATH x-xi (1981)); see also supranote 1.
147. John Blume, Killing the Willing: "Volunteers," Suicide, and Competency, 103
MICH. L. REV. 939, 950 n.54 (2005) (citing ROBERT JOHNSON, DEATH WORK: A STUDY OF
THE MODERN EXECUTION PROCESS 63 (2d ed. 1998)).
148. Id. at 950 n.54.
149. See Marah Stith McLeod, Does the Death Penalty Require Death Row?-The Harm
of Legislative Silence, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 525, 538 (2016) ("Most states impose restrictions on
death-sentenced inmates that isolate them from human interactions.").
150. Id. at 538. Prison administrators are responsible for establishing and maintaining
death row. There is no legislative mandate. For example, South Carolina's death penalty
statute (S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20), not only does not mention that those sentenced to death
must be segregated from others, but also does not mention that those sentenced to death need
to have additional restrictions in place.
151. ACLU, A DEATH BEFORE DYING: SOLITARY CONFINEMENT ON DEATH Row 4, 9
(2013).
152. Id. at 4.
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exercise time;' denial of access to religious services; 5 4 denial of access to
work or employment opportunities; 5 5 and no-contact visitations with family
members and loved ones.

Studies have consistently shown that prisoners subjected to isolation
suffer the same symptoms caused by physical torture or suffer a great deal of
psychological harm. 5 7 These studies have shown that people subjected to
solitary confinement exhibit a variety of physiological and psychological
reactions including perceptual distortions and hallucinations, 5 8 appetite loss
and weight loss,159 problems sleeping,160 talking to oneself,161 and lower

levels of brain functioning.162 Additionally, suicide rates and incidents of
self-harm are much higher in solitary confinement.163
Further, research has shown that prisoners with pre-existing mental
illnesses prior to incarceration are particularly vulnerable to suffering from
this inescapable isolation.164 Any pre-existing mental illnesses, which have
been statistically proven to be prevalent among South Carolina death row
inmates, are exacerbated by these harsh conditions. 1 Solitary confinement
for the mentally ill offender poses a grave risk of psychiatric injury, self-

&

153. Exercise, for those states that permit death row inmates to have an hour or less of
exercise, often consists of leaving their cell to go to a cage, pen, or cell. Access to exercise
equipment, or even a simple ball to bounce, is extremely rare. Id. at 5.
154. Id at 6
155. Id at 5.
156. Id; see also supra note 1 (John Doe said that he has only been able to touch his
fifteen-year-old daughter three times during her lifetime).
157. ACLU, supra note 151, at 6 (citing Hernin Reyes, The Worst Scars Are In The
Mind: Psychological Torture, 89 INT. REV. OF THE RED CROSS 591, 608 (2007); Metin
Basoglu, et al., Torture vs. Other Cruel, Inhuman and DegradingTreatment: Is the Distinction
Real or Apparent?, 64 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 277, 277 (2007)); see also Craig Haney,
A Culture ofHarm: Taming the Dynamics of Cruelty in Supermax Prisons, 35 CRIM. JUST.
BEHAV.
956,
956
(2008),
https://www.aclu.org/other/stop-solitary-mental-healthresources?redirect=prisoners-rights/stop-solitary-mental-health-resources
(explaining
that
courts have expressed concern and condemnation that prisoners who are housed in supermax
prisons suffer actual psychological harm).
158. ACLU, supra note 151, at 6 (citing Craig Haney, Mental Issues in Long-Term
Solitary and "Supermax " Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 124, 130, 134 (2003)).
159. Id. at 7 (citing Haney, supra note 158, at 130).
160. Id
161. Id (citing Haney, supranote 158, at 130).
162. Id
163. Id. (citing Expert Report of Professor Craig Haney at 45-46, n.119, Coleman v.
Schwarzenegger/ Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No: Civ S 90-0520 LKK-JFM P, CO1-1351 TEH
(E.D. Cal/N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2008)).
164. Metzner & Fellner, supra note 15, at 105.
165. Id
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harm, and even suicide because depriving these prisoners of social
interaction keeps them from being grounded in reality.166
There is also evidence that offenders within the South Carolina prison
system have not been receiving adequate professional mental health
services.167 The South Carolina Department of Corrections was sued in 2005
on behalf of several inmates who were suffering from mental illnesses.16s A
state judge in Columbia, Michael Baxley, ruled that South Carolina prison
officials were culpable of pervasive, systematic, unremitting violations of
the state's constitution by abusing and neglecting mentally ill inmates.169 He
wrote that the Court found that SCDC is severely understaffed with respect
to mental health officials,1 70 the mentally ill are exposed to disproportionate
use of force and segregation when compared with non-mentally ill
inmates,' 7 ' the mental health services at SCDC lack a sufficiently systematic
program to maintain treatment records,172 administration of psychotropic
medications are inadequately supervised and evaluated,1 73 and the current
policies for suicide prevention and crisis intervention are inadequate and
result in the unnecessary loss of life among the seriously mentally ill
inmates.1 74

He also wrote that mentally ill inmates spend a disproportionately
longer period of time in solitary confinement. 7 5 One mentally ill inmate,
James Wilson, spent 2,491 consecutive days in solitary confinement.
Often times, these extended sentences exceeded an inmate's projected
release date by over five years. 7 7 These extended stays in solitary
confinement are contrary to the American Correctional Association's

166. Id.; see generally U.N. Secretary-General, Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
DegradingTreatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. A/66/268 (Aug. 5, 2011).
167. See infra notes 168-185; see also Interview with Joshua Jones, Inmate, at S.C.
Dep't of Corrections (Nov. 16, 2016) (where Jones said that his counselor was no longer
working for the prison and that he had not seen another counselor in months, but he was still
on his medication).
168. Andrew Cohen, Fhen Good People Do Nothing: The Appalling Story of South
Carolina's Prisons, ATLANTIC
(Jan.
10,
2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/
national/archive/2014/01/when-good-people-do-nothing-the-appalling-story-of-southcarolinas-prisons/282938/.
169. Order Granting Judgement in Favor of Plaintiffs, T.R., P.R., & K.W. v. S.C. Dep't
of Corr. & William R. Byars, 2005-CP-40-2925 (Dist. Ct. S.C. Jan. 8, 2014).
170. Id. at 6.
17 1. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 5.
175. Id. at 11.
176. Cohen, supra note 168.
177. Byars, 2005-CP-40-2925 at 11.
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standards of disciplinary confinement for short periods of time.17 Taking
into account the facts that death row inmates spend the totality of their
incarceration in solitary confinement 79 and that a majority of these inmates
suffer from some form of mental illness, 8 o these inmates are likely to
experience an exacerbation of symptoms or relapse.
Further, the Order discussed the conditions of these solitary confinement
cells and the treatment towards the mentally ill inmates within the unit.'
One inmate with schizophrenia, Jerome Laudman, was sprayed with
chemical munitions and physically abused by a correctional officer.12 He
was found lying on the cell floor in feces, vomit, and up to twenty trays of
molding food.1 83 The nurses and correctional officers refused to enter
Laudman's cell, and he was eventually retrieved by two inmates.184 He died
later that day of a heart attack and the hospital note reported the presence of
hypothermia.

If these are the conditions for mentally ill prisoners who have received a
disciplinary sentence to solitary confinement, it makes one question what
occurs behind the closed doors and restricted access of South Carolina's
death row facilities. Solitary confinement is not recommended beyond "a
short period,"'8 6 yet these death row inmates are subjected to it for
decades. 8 7
V.

STATE LEGISLATURES ADDRESSING THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE
MENTALLY ILL

As discussed earlier in this Note, professional organizations and some
courts support exempting the mentally ill from the death penalty."s

178. Id at 13 (citing AM. CORRECTIONAL AsS'N, ACA STANDARDS FOR ADULT
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS SUPPLEMENT 306 (2008)) (explaining that the American
Correctional Association defines disciplinary detention or punitive segregation in the ACA
Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions as "a form of separation from the general
population . . for short periods of time [in] individual cells separated from the general
population").
179. Johnson, supra note 146.
180. Byars, 2005-CP-40-2925 at 2.
181. Cohen, supra note 168.
182. Byars, 2005-CP-40-2925 at 15.
183. Id
184. Id
185. Id
186. Id
187. Johnson, supra note 146.
188. See generally ABA, supranote 83 (showing examples of professional organizations
and court decisions supporting this exemption)
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'

Additionally, other states have recently begun to recognize that mentally ill
offenders have a diminished culpability that should prohibit the use of the
death penalty against them. 8 9 For example, Connecticut recently prohibited
the execution of the mentally ill.190 Connecticut exempts a capital defendant
from execution if his "mental capacity was significantly impaired or [his]
ability to conform [his] conduct to the requirements of law was significantly
impaired but not so impaired in either case as to constitute a defense to
prosecution[.]"' 9
Other states have proposed similar legislation banning the execution of
the mentally ill.192 Legislators in North Carolina and Kentucky introduced

nearly identical bills, pulling language from American Bar Association's
Recommendation 122A,' 93 to prohibit the execution of defendants who, at
the time of the offense, "had a severe mental disorder or disability that
significantly impaired their capacity to (a) appreciate the nature,
consequences, or wrongfulness of their conduct, (b) exercise rational
judgment in relation to conduct, or (c) conform their conduct to the
requirements of the laws."1 94 Illinois also considered an act banning the
execution of the mentally ill, however, it ultimately abolished the death
penalty altogether in 2011.195

Tennessee legislators introduced a bill to prohibit the execution of a
person who had severe and persistent mental illness at the time of
committing murder in the first degree.196 In addition, Indiana introduced
legislation to prohibit the use of the death penalty on an individual judicially
determined to have had a severe mental illness, defined as schizophrenia,
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, major depression, or delusional

189. See, e.g., Overstreet v. State, 877 N.E.2d 144 (2007) (finding no principled
distinction between the diminished capacities exhibited of the mentally ill defendant and the
diminished capacities that exempt the mentally retarded from execution); see also Bryan v.
Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1237 (2003) (finding that the logic used in Atkins should apply to those
who suffer severe mental disabilities).
190. CONN. CODE ANN. § 53a-46a (h)(3) (2009).
191. Id.; see also State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, 45-46, 122 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2015) (where
the Connecticut Supreme Court abolished the death penalty altogether stating that "the death
penalty . . is so out of step with our contemporary standards of decency as to violate the state
constitutional ban on excessive and disproportionate punishment").
192. See ABA, supra note 83.
193. Id.
194. State v. Lang, 129 Ohio St. 3d 512, 650 (2011).
195. See PAAVOLA, supra note 5, at 1. see also Ray Long, Illinois Death Penalty Ban
Takes
Effect
Friday,
CHI.
TRIBUNE
(June
30,
2011),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/chi-illinois-death-penalty-ban-takes-effectfriday-20110630-story.html
196. See PAAVOLA, supranote 5, at 2.
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disorder at the time of the offense.1 97 The number of states contemplating
banning the execution of mentally ill defendants offers influential support
that our society views mentally ill offenders as less culpable than the
average criminal defendant.
Bill 3535, currently residing in the House Judiciary Committee,' 98 was
proposed to the South Carolina legislature in February 2015.199 This bill
would ban the execution of an offender that had a severe mentally disability
at the time of the commission of the crime.200 The bill defines severe mental
disability as "a severe mental illness that significantly impairs a person's
capacity to do any of the following: (i) appreciate the nature, consequences,
or wrongfulness of the person's conduct; (ii) exercise rational judgment in
relation to conduct; or (iii) conform the person's conduct to the requirements
of the law . .. 201 or as "dementia or traumatic brain injury that results in
significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning, existing
concurrently with significant limitations in adaptive functioning."20 2
VI. CONCLUSION

The execution of defendants who are mentally ill is contrary to the
evolving "standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society"203 and violates the Eighth Amendment against cruel and unusual
204
In addition to rectifying the constitutional violation against
punishment.
cruel and unusual punishment, an exemption for mentally ill defendants
from the death penalty would provide economic benefits by significantly
reducing the years of lengthy and costly litigation. If judges could rule that a
defendant was mentally ill and therefore exempted from the death penalty,
the case would proceed as a non-capital one. Due to the fact that capital
trials require additional protections such as a sentencing hearing where in-

197. Legislation Limiting the Execution of Individuals with Mental Illness, DEATH
INFO.
CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/mental-illness-and-deathpenalty#legislation (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
198. H. 3535, 121 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2015).
199. See John Blume & Lindsey Vann, Forty Years of Death: The Past, Present, and
Future of the Death Penalty in South Carolina (Or Still Arbitrary after All These Years), 11
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 183 (2016); see also H.R. 3535, 121st Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (S.C. 2015).
200. H.R. 3535, 121st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2015).
201. Id
202. Id
203. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958)).
204. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
PENALTY
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depth mitigating evidence is presented based on months or years of
205
mitigation specialists conducting research,
the expenses of a capital trial
206
are much higher than that of a non-capital case. Moreover, due to the fact
207
that "death is different"
and capital defendants receive automatic appeals
as well as elected appeals,208 the costs and duration of a full capital trial to
execution increase time and expenses.209 Legislation banning the death
penalty for the mentally ill would essentially act as a sentencing cap by
disallowing the death penalty, yet still allowing a defendant to receive life in
prison without the possibility of parole.
Ultimately, the diminished culpability of the mentally ill, like the
diminished culpability of the mentally retarded or juvenile, makes the
execution of these individuals a violation against cruel and unusual
punishment. Further, neither retribution or deterrence, which Courts have
identified as necessary for upholding a death penalty is served by executing
the mentally ill.210 Therefore, the South Carolina legislature should adopt a

statutory ban on the execution of these mentally ill defendants. South
Carolina cannot forget they are human.

205. Paul Bruno, The Mitigation Specialist, NAT'L AsS'N OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE
LAWYERS, https://www.nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=14626 (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).
206. RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, THE 2% DEATH
PENALTY: HOW A MINORITY OF COUNTIES PRODUCE MOST DEATH CASES AT ENORMOUS
COSTS To ALL (2013) (discussing the expense of a capital trial case).
207. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (Joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.) (explaining that the "penalty of death is different in kind from any other
punishment" and emphasizing its "uniqueness").
208. Death Penalty Appeals Process, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN CONTEXT, http://www.
capitalpunishmentincontext.org/resources/dpappealsprocess
(last visited Jan. 3, 2017)
(explaining the death penalty appeals process).
209. DIETER, supra note 206, at 2.
210. See supra Part III.
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